Amid persisting concerns over how mineral exploitation is entangled with conflict, human rights abuses, smuggling, and corruption, the Kimberley Process (KP) keeps resurfacing as a go-to model. Its core approach – a certification scheme meant to ban conflict diamonds, which now account for allegedly less than 1% of the global trade – is being held up as an answer to a wide range of mineral-related challenges: from tightening critical mineral governance in the Great Lakes region, to harnessing mineral wealth in West Africa, to regulating conflict gold. Yet its seemingly quick fix solution is deceptive: in practice it does more to conceal problems than to resolve them.
The KP certification scheme was launched in 2003 in response to rebels funding insurgencies through the diamond trade in countries like Sierra Leone, Angola, and Liberia. To this day, these – and only these – specific situations fall under the KP’s narrow definition of “conflict diamonds”, which can then trigger an embargo that suspends a country from the global trade. Since its inception, the KP has officially labelled only two situations as involving “conflict diamonds”: Côte d’Ivoire in the mid-to-late 2000s and the Central African Republic from 2013 to 2024. In fact, the KP defines success less by tackling the many contexts where diamonds fuel violence and abuse than by confirming the far more numerous situations where it will not act or suspend certification.
The KP’s track record exposes its structural flaws and reveals why it has not been – and should not be – replicated for other minerals, where governance has shifted toward due diligence approaches. These put companies, not governments, in the driver’s seat and focus on ongoing risk identification, prevention and mitigation. Several features of the KP show why it is the wrong model to follow for today’s complex mineral governance challenges:
- Institutional inertia: a global, state-led, consensus-based scheme tends to preserve the status quo rather than drive reform. After three years of negotiations, the launch of the KP certification scheme in 2003 was conceived as a temporary compromise to be progressively improved. Yet, it has since stagnated due to lack of shared motivation to move beyond its original mandate and address wider forms of violence or human rights abuse associated with the diamond trade. Worse, the KP has deflected attention from its weaknesses and discouraged serious engagement with, or learning from, emerging due diligence frameworks in other mineral sectors.
- Burden of proof and control falls solely on states, not on companies: the KP certification model is not backed by robust, streamlined controls. It simply assumes that once a government designates an authority and adopts a legal framework, it can guarantee the integrity of all domestic trade flows – however complex. In practice, this is unrealistic, especially in countries with large artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sectors. Despite the complexity, the private sector is not required to undergo independent audits, publish results, or report on compliance, which are the basic requirements of any scheme to align with the OECD Due Diligence for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals. As a result, KP member states lack independent data to verify the basis on which certificates are issued.
- Incentive to conceal problems, not to identify risks: because governments have a strong interest in upholding the validity of their certificates, many are inclined to downplay weaknesses and resist open reporting of risks. The KP’s experience shows that this reluctance to acknowledge problems has meant minimal progress over two decades in strengthening in-country oversight and traceability or closing loopholes in global trade. A case in point is that, despite leaving obvious gaps in the supposedly certified chain, KP controls still apply only to rough diamonds and stop once a stone is cut or polished, while “mixed origin” KP certificates can be issued without limitation in trading hubs and need not specify the countries of origin. Similarly, the KP managed to stop only a handful of shipments from embargoed Côte d’Ivoire and the Central African Republic, meaning that hundreds of thousands of carats of what the KP itself defines as conflict diamonds still entered global supply chains.
- No public reporting and peer complacency: the KP shows that when governments monitor each other on highly technical issues – without independent or specialized oversight – the system becomes vulnerable to conflicts of interest and gradually loses rigor. Within the KP, strict confidentiality rules create a persistent lack of transparency, which further undermines accountability. Reviews have become increasingly infrequent and shallow, with little follow-up or tracking of recommendations, turning what should be a tool for reform into a ritual box-ticking exercise.
- Limits of the quasi-tripartite model: the KP’s so-called tripartite structure – bringing together governments, industry, and civil society – is unequal as only governments have decision-making power. It offers a platform for dialogue, but cannot fix the scheme’s fundamental flaws or reverse its deteriorating dynamics. This imbalance is compounded by shrinking civic space and intimidation of civil society, both in many member countries and within the KP itself, making it harder to voice criticism or confront uncomfortable realities.
- Risk of greenwashing: the KP’s apparent simplicity makes it politically attractive as a “quick fix”, but its track record shows it enables greenwashing: it creates an illusion of progress while dodging the hard work of tackling complex problems. Despite weak controls and a narrow, the KP certificate is widely used as an ethical seal of approval. At the same time, KP “conflict-free” certificates continue to be issued, without restrictions, for diamonds that bolster Russia’s war chest against Ukraine or are traded by the notorious Wagner mercenary group in the Central African Republic.
- No room for progressive improvement: a state-led, end-to-end certification scheme like the KP reduces complex governance realities to a simple yes-or-no verdict on whether minerals can be traded. This binary logic may reassure downstream buyers and consumers, but it leaves little space for progressive improvement on complex challenges that require long-term commitment rather than disengagement through sanctions.
However strong the desire for swift progress in breaking the links between minerals, conflict and human rights abuse, we must acknowledge that lasting change takes time. Even if progress with due diligence schemes and approaches has been uneven and at times disappointing, they remain an important tool that places accountability on all actors across the supply chain. Making these efforts more effective means embedding them in regulation to level the playing field, committing to independent and in-depth supply chain audits, and increasing transparency and independent monitoring.
At the same time, we must be realistic about what due diligence can achieve: it can help create cleaner supply chains, but it cannot by itself deliver positive development outcomes or guarantee security. Those ultimately depend on sound governance and coordinated governmental and intergovernmental action. The road ahead is long and complex, which makes it all the more important to avoid getting stuck in new dead ends by failing to learn from past mistakes.
IPIS (International Peace Information Service)
* Brad Brooks-Rubin, a former U.S. government lead on the Kimberley Process and former senior advisor in the U.S. State Department’s Office of Sanctions Coordination who led several policy efforts related to diamonds, gold, and minerals, also contributed to this analysis.