

YEAR IN REVIEW

2001–2002 Partnership Africa Canada

Why does NEPAD give reason for hope?



Jacqueline Nkoyok

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a commitment from Africa's leaders to eradicate poverty and to put their countries on the path of growth and development. This is not, however, Africa's first initiative to develop the continent. There have been several plans before NEPAD to tackle the challenges of development, most notably the Lagos Plan of Action and the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes, that had the same objectives as NEPAD. Why does NEPAD give reasons for hope?

Compared with preceding initiatives to stimulate Africa's development, NEPAD is different in its approach. For the first time African Heads of State and Government have acknowledged the continent's problems in terms of governance, democracy and human rights. They have stressed their role as Africans in determining Africa's vision of development. At the same time, they have recognized the importance of peace and security as key factors in development.

For many years, civil society organizations have called for another Africa, an Africa where there is democracy, transparency, accountability, economic justice, sustainable human development and support for the initiatives of Africa's peoples. NEPAD recognizes the negative impact of poor political governance on previous African initiatives. It sets itself objectives with a view to rehabilitating the political and bureaucratic environment of participating countries in line with the principles of democracy and good governance, which Africa's peoples, along with the international community, have demanded.

Democracy and good governance are considered essential elements for achieving economic growth and the reduction of poverty, in that they contribute to reducing conflicts, reassuring foreign investors and creating a climate of social harmony allowing ordinary people to go about their business. In order to halve the number of poor people by 2015, in line with the millennium development goals, Africa must mobilize financial resources in the order of 12% of its GDP, or some US\$64 billion. Hence the need to create national environments capable of encouraging domestic savings and strategies aimed at attracting to Africa external resources that at the moment are avoiding it. Africa represents only about 1% of world trade. But it's not that Africa is "not integrated" into the world economy, it's "badly integrated", for it exports mainly primary products and imports manufactured goods, causing a chronic trade deficit. Clearly, Africa has to industrialize.

G8 countries should give urgent support the development efforts of African countries by adjusting international policies that have contributed to past failures, and which have overshadowed African development alternatives. The 21st century may be one of hope, where governments and their peoples, the North and the South, will share a common vision on the need to rethink together the destiny of Africa, and of the world.

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CIVIL SOCIETY, NEPAD AND THE G8

In July 2001, the Organization of African Unity Heads of State Summit in Lusaka launched the New African Initiative, which was later renamed the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). G8 leaders meeting in Italy welcomed this initiative and announced that the June 2002 G8 Summit in Canada would focus on Africa.

A serious flaw in the development of NEPAD and its launch by the OAU was the absence of consultation in Africa. Not only was there little or no discussion in parliaments, in the media or with civil society organizations in advance of the OAU Lusaka Summit, there was no significant attempt to publicize the initiative in the months following its launch. PAC and other civil society organizations reacted to this by sharing information about NEPAD across Africa and by encouraging civil society groups to begin a dialogue in their respective countries. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) created a special NEPAD outreach fund to help African organizations dialogue around NEPAD and PAC brought this to the attention of many groups in Africa. PAC collaborated with the Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA), an Ethiopian NGO coalition, in holding national and regional meetings on NEPAD in Addis Ababa in 2002.

Partnership Africa Canada, together with Alternatives and A-Dialogue, organized a conference in Ottawa in October 2001 to draw attention

to the NEPAD initiative and to encourage a broad range of Canadian organizations to become involved in dialogue on African development in the lead up to the G8 Summit. PAC joined a national steering group that helped organize the G6B (Group of Six Billion) Civil Society Summit that took place in Calgary in June 2002, just prior to the G8 Summit. Recommendations from the G6B were presented to the Canadian government on the eve of the G8 Summit.

The G8 Summit in Canada has come and gone and, on the ground, the nuts and bolts of the various action plans are slowly being put together. It's clear that, while there may be significant increases in aid levels from some countries (after a decade of reductions), there will be no 'Marshall Plan' for Africa, not even for the AIDS pandemic. In response to this, civil society must advocate for change. In the north, reforms must be made to national and international policies that affect Africa in priority areas such as trade, debt, aid levels, arms transfers and private sector investment. In African countries, dialogue must be sought with governments and pressure increased to achieve a minimum level of democracy, human rights and good governance. NEPAD needs to be improved and this has to be done on the ground, rather than at summits. Civil society is well placed to argue for these improvements and it should be helped as a priority to do so.

AFRICAN NATURAL RESOURCES NETWORKS

Partnership Africa Canada has strengthened its collaboration with African civil society organizations working on natural resources issues. PAC supported a workshop in Kinshasa in 2002 on the plunder of Congo's diamonds and other natural resources, that was organized by the Congolese NGO, Centre National d'Appui au Développement et à la Participation Populaire (CENADEP). The workshop led to the creation of a national network to stop the plunder of Congo's natural resources. CENADEP is the focal point.

In Sierra Leone, the civil society Campaign for Just Mining, led by the Network Movement for Justice and Development, has developed further its education and advocacy programme, with support from PAC. In 2002, it presented a report to the Government detailing its recommendations for reforming the mining sector. A workshop was held in 2002, in collaboration with Third World Network and PAC, which brought together NGO activists from a number of African countries to develop strategies with respect to natural resources management, justice and human security.

NOBEL PEACE PRIZE NOMINATION FOR 2003

Partnership Africa Canada and Global Witness have been nominated for the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize. The nomination was made by United States Congressmen Tony P. Hall and Frank R. Wolf, and by US Senator Patrick Leahy, for the efforts that the two organizations have devoted to ending the trade in 'conflict diamonds.'

The Boards of Directors and staff of Partnership Africa Canada and Global Witness are greatly honoured by the nomination. Many organizations and individuals are now putting huge efforts into the issue of conflict diamonds—the diamond industry, dozens of governments, the media, politicians, academics and hundreds of civil society organizations. The nomination is recognition that together we have made great strides in recent months, not least in the Kimberley Process. The Kimberley Process is not yet complete, however, and a great deal of work remains for it to become operational and effective.

In the end, our work is not about an award, and it is not about agreements. It is about putting an end to the horrific wars in Africa that are being fueled by natural resources, and by the apathy that allows these resources to be traded for weapons and, ultimately, for human lives. Global Witness and PAC will continue to undertake and coordinate research, dialogue and action on conflict diamonds until the issue has been adequately resolved.

The nomination letter can be found at the following web sites:
www.globalwitness.org
www.partnershipafricacanada.org

NGOS, CONFLICT DIAMONDS AND THE K



Ian Smillie

On a cold November day in 2002, in the small Swiss town of Interlaken, the world's diamond industry, the governments of more than 50 countries, and a small group of NGOs put their seal of approval on an agreement to end the trade in conflict diamonds.

Conflict diamonds were first exposed in late 1998 by the British NGO, Global Witness, which publicized the fact that diamonds were fueling the UNITA war machine in Angola. A year later, Partnership Africa Canada released its own report: *The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security*. That report told the story of Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel movement devoid of ideology, ethnic backing or territorial claims, reliant almost exclusively on diamonds to fuel its brutal war. Partnership Africa Canada's report exposed international diamond fraud of massive proportions. It accused the diamond industry at large of complicity, and it targeted Belgian authorities for closing their eyes to massive corruption. Diamonds were also a source of corruption and conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where an estimated 2.5 million people died during the second half of the 1990s as a result of the resource wars. In 1999, the Security Council Sanctions Committee on Angola fielded an 'expert panel' to examine the connection between diamonds and weapons. It confirmed what the NGOs had already shown.

The government of South Africa called a meeting of interested governments, NGOs and the diamond industry in May 2000. This was the beginning of what became known as the 'Kimberley Process', and it eventually culminated, a dozen meetings and 30 months later, at Interlaken. The road from Kimberley to Interlaken was bumpy. But to its credit, the diamond industry had realized by the summer of 2000 that if it didn't take the NGO charges seriously, it faced a commercial disaster. In July 2000, the Antwerp World Diamond Congress, a biennial gathering of the most important companies in the diamond world, was devoted almost completely to the issue of conflict diamonds. The NGO antagonists, including PAC, were invited: the diamond industry was moving rapidly from a position of denial to one of engagement.

By then, other NGOs were becoming more involved. Two African NGOs helped develop broad coalitions in their own countries: first, the Network Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD) in Sierra Leone, and more recently the Centre National d'Appui au

Développement et à la Participation Populaire (CENADEP) in the DRC. Fatal Transactions in the Netherlands was formed by five European NGOs to act as a focal point on diamonds. Oxfam International became involved, as did Amnesty International and World Vision. Their US representatives came with the backing of a growing coalition of American NGOs, including several church organizations. The purpose of the growing campaign was not to hurt the industry; it was to stop conflict diamonds. But there were occasions when NGOs asked themselves whether negotiation was the right approach.

A blanket inter-governmental agreement was the only real answer, backed by national legislation in the countries that produce and trade rough diamonds. The core idea was a global certification system for all rough diamonds. Each diamond producing country would ensure that no conflict diamonds entered the pipeline between the mine and the point of export, guaranteeing that its diamonds were conflict free. The second part of the emerging system related to international shipments and the need for standardized, tamper-proof parcels, accompanied by forgery-proof certificates. The third part concerned countries like Belgium, Britain and Israel, where rough diamonds are sorted and re-exported. How could there be any assurance that the re-exports were clean, when it was commonplace for smugglers to unload millions of dollars worth of undeclared goods in Antwerp, Tel Aviv and New York every year? A partial answer came from the World Diamond Council, which offered to develop an auditable 'chain of warranties', tracking diamonds by value and weight as they move from one dealer to another.

Many issues arose in the Kimberley Process: the conformity of the plan with WTO obligations; statistics; Chinese efforts to exclude Taiwan. At the September 2001 meeting in London, NGOs presented a petition published by Action Aid that was signed by over 200 organizations in Europe, North America, Africa, Latin America, Asia and Australia, demanding more decisive action. American NGOs worked with dedicated congressmen sponsoring a 'Clean Diamond Bill' to ban conflict diamonds from the US. NGOs worked closely with all the major international television networks, with radio, print media and the Internet. Feature articles appeared in *Esquire*, *National Geographic*, *the New York Times*, *Der Spiegel* and *Jornal do Brazil*. PAC produced studies on the diamond trade in Guinea, Southern Africa, Canada, Congo and India. PAC also produced a follow-up report on Sierra Leone which examined the role of the Lebanese diaspora in the illicit diamond trade, and it reviewed other international agreements for their provisions on monitoring.

IDS KIMBERLEY PROCESS

In all this, the NGOs had three sets of allies. The first was the diamond industry. Although the relationship was frequently adversarial, the industry knew that an effective agreement was necessary to get the NGOs off their back. The second was the United Nations. The Security Council Expert Panel report on Angola meant that it was no longer 'just' an NGO campaign. Other Expert Panels followed: Sierra Leone, the DRC, Liberia, confirming and reconfirming the connection between war and diamonds. In December 2000, the UN General Assembly passed a unanimous resolution endorsing the Kimberley Process, giving it new legitimacy, and a time frame.

The third ally, and perhaps the most important, was the Government of South Africa. Without a governmental champion, the process would certainly have taken a very different form. In fact the thing most feared by the industry and South Africa—an NGO boycott—might well have come to pass. South Africa called the first Kimberley meeting, and it chaired the process throughout the following months. It gathered and disseminated information, it did the background preparations for all the meetings and hosted three.

In March 2002, a make-or-break Kimberley Meeting was held in Ottawa, and by the end, only one serious problem remained. NGOs had insisted from the outset that the system would only be credible and effective if there was regular, independent monitoring of all national control systems. If all countries were eligible to join, there was an obligation that all be subject to regular inspection. Why would more rules be any more effective than the laws already in place against theft, murder, sanctions busting and human rights abuse? The draft Kimberley agreement, however, left monitoring vaguely to annual plenary meetings and cases of 'significant non-compliance'.

Between March and November 2002, governments worked to ensure that the required regulations would be in place to enable a launch in January 2003. There were only a few minor holdouts—countries that did not seem to understand that their diamonds would soon be banned from world trade. A few glitches remained at the end of 2002. The system for gathering and disseminating statistics has still not

been worked out, although this is expected early in 2003. And the major NGO concern remains regarding the lack of regular independent monitoring.

These issues notwithstanding, several important changes will take place after January 1, 2003. First, countries that have been laundering a quarter of a billion dollars worth of illicit diamonds will be stopped from doing so. These include the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Gambia, Rwanda and Uganda. Second, all participating governments will issue certificates of legitimacy for rough diamonds leaving their borders. Even if there is no clear monitoring process, they will be on record as authenticating their exports. In due course, inspection will come. If not formally agreed by the Kimberley Process, it will be done by NGOs, by journalists, or by the Security Council. One way or another, governments will be obliged to deal with the demand for public scrutiny of their diamond control systems. And thirdly, diamond shipments that are not accompanied by the proper documentation will be refused entry or seized. NGOs expect more bumps in the road, but they intend to participate actively as the system is rolled out. They intend to keep pressing for an appropriate monitoring system.

War continues in West Africa, lapping across the borders of Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire, and diamonds continue to play a role. Conflict and resource plunder continue in the DRC. And while Angola now has no war, there is no real peace, and there will be none until the corruption of the diamond and oil industries give way to investments that end the poverty that plagues so many hundreds of thousands of Angolans. This, in the end, will be the continuing challenge for the diamond industry, and for governments that benefit from it: to ensure not only that conflict diamonds are halted, but that this enormous resource, which has caused so much death and destruction, is now used for development; an insistence not just that diamonds do no harm, but that they actually do some good as well.

Ian Smillie
Research Coordinator
Partnership Africa Canada

Illicit diamond digging in Kono District, Sierra Leone



NEW PUBLICATIONS IN 2001 AND 2002

- > *Other Facets*, a periodic newsletter about the international effort to end diamond-related conflict (8 issues)
- > *Africa and the G8, conference report* (October 2001)
- > *Destabilizing Guinea: Diamonds, Charles Taylor and the Potential for Wider Humanitarian Catastrophe* (October 2001)
- > *Fire in the Ice: Benefits, Protection and regulation in the Canadian Diamond Industry* (January 2002)
- > *Diamonds: Forever or for Good? The Economic Impact of Diamonds in Southern Africa* (March 2002)
- > *Hard Currency: The Criminalized Diamond Economy of the Democratic Republic of Congo and its Neighbours* (June 2002)

- > *The Kimberley Process: The Case for Proper Monitoring* (September 2002)
- > *War and Peace in Sierra Leone: Diamonds, Corruption and the Lebanese Connection* (November 2002)
- > *No Problems Here: Success, Complacency and Suspicion in the Indian Diamond Industry* (December 2002)

All PAC publications are available in full on PAC's web site: www.partnershipafricacanada.org

See the Resources section for a selection of recent reports and documents on African issues from a wide variety of sources.

All PAC Publications may also be obtained by contacting PAC at: hsda@partnershipafricacanada.org

STATEMENT OF REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE FOR 2001-2002 at March 31, 2002

REVENUE	2002	2001	EXPENDITURE	2002	2001
Canadian International Development Agency	\$315,639	\$205,414	Programme	\$103,000	\$99,293
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade	45,463	58,730	Administrative overhead	37,482	26,707
Department for International Development (U.K.)	37,627	13,466	Special initiatives	-	10,625
MacArthur Foundation	93,419	8,203	Special projects	465,966	217,052
Non-government organizations	102,340	61,935		<hr/>	<hr/>
Interest	5,570	2,263	Excess (deficiency) of revenues over expenses	(\$2,622)	(\$1,373)
Membership fees	1,250	950	Excess (deficiency) in net assets at end of year	(\$3,995)	(\$1,373)
Other	3,456	1,343			
Total	<hr/> \$604,773	<hr/> \$352,304			

A complete version of the Audited Statements by *McIntyre and McLarty* is available from Partnership Africa Canada.

COLOURS OF AFRICA

The April 2002 *Colours of Africa* festival brought new African feature films to the Ottawa-Gatineau region from countries such as Algeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Rwanda, Senegal and Tunisia. Audiences were able to discuss with African film directors and producers. The *Colours of Africa* 2002 festival was organized by PAC and seven other Ottawa-based NGOs, in collaboration with Vues d'Afrique. The 2003 festival will be held between May 1-4.



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African and Canadian member organizations of PAC
Action Aid (Great Britain)
A-Dialogue (Canada)
African Centre for Civil Society - ECA (Ethiopia)
African Peace and Conflict Management Studies Centre (Ethiopia)
African Union
Amnesty International
Canadian International Development Agency
Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee
Centre National d'Appui au Développement et à la Participation Populaire (RD Congo)
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Global Witness (Great Britain)
Interagency Coalition on AIDS and Development (Canada)
International Peace Information Service (Belgium)
International Society for Peace and Human Rights (Canada)
Network Movement for Justice and Development (Sierra Leone)
NiZA (Netherlands)

Oxfam International
Rights and Democracy (Canada)
Somali-Canadian Institute for Research and Development (Canada)
Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group (Canada)
Third World Network (Ghana)
UN-OSCAL
World Vision

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Canadian Autoworkers Social Justice Fund (Canada)
Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace (Canada)
Canadian International Development Agency
Canadian Labour Congress
Centre canadien d'étude et de coopération internationale
Christian Reformed World Relief Committee (Canada)
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)
Department for International Development (Great Britain)
International Development Research Centre (Canada)
Inter Pares (Canada)
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (USA)
Oxfam Canada
Oxfam GB
World Vision

